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Abstract
We present statistical evidence and dynamical models for the management of conflict and a division of labor (task
specialization) in a primate society. Two broad intervention strategy classes are observed– a dyadic strategy – pacifying
interventions, and a triadic strategy –policing interventions. These strategies, their respective degrees of specialization, and
their consequences for conflict dynamics can be captured through empirically-grounded mathematical models inspired by
immuno-dynamics. The spread of aggression, analogous to the proliferation of pathogens, is an epidemiological problem.
We show analytically and computationally that policing is an efficient strategy as it requires only a small proportion of a
population to police to reduce conflict contagion. Policing, but not pacifying, is capable of effectively eliminating conflict.
These results suggest that despite implementation differences there might be universal features of conflict management
mechanisms for reducing contagion-like dynamics that apply across biological and social levels. Our analyses further
suggest that it can be profitable to conceive of conflict management strategies at the behavioral level as mechanisms of
social immunity.
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Introduction
In large societies of individuals or cells, sophisticated regulatory
mechanisms are required to control conflict and promote coor-
dination [1–7]. These conflict management mechanisms can
involve specialization through to a full division of labor [8,9], or
the creation of social norms that reinforce roles and behavioral
patterns [10]. The organism has a dedicated suite of conflict
management mechanisms, including an immune system, that
regulates cell-cell and cell-pathogen interactions [11–13]. Beyond
research on policing in social insects [14,15] and punishment in
human societies (e.g. [15–17]), relatively little is known about
conflict management dynamics in animal societies. The common
presumption that organismal conflicts of interest promote a tragedy
of the commons has generated low expectations for group-level
regulation.
Nonetheless, conflicts in animal societies lead to fights, and these
do not typically overwhelm the group or result in severe injury or
death as there are a variety of mechanisms animals use for
resolving disputes or mitigating the effects of aggression [2]. In
some societies conflicts are managed by other individuals in the
group[2,6]. One management strategy third-parties use is to calm
agitated individuals (see box 13.1 in [18]), forestalling aggression.
These interventions are called pacifying interventions. A second
strategy is an impartial intervention –a policing intervention– in
which all conflict participants are targeted indiscriminately by a
third-party through aggression, or through the implicit threat of
aggression inherent in an approach by the third-party [6]. Both
pacifying and policing interventions can cause the fight to
terminate and/or aggression to dissipate [6].
In this paper we use an immuno-dynamics modeling approach
[19,20] to explore the consequences of third-party conflict
management for the contagion of aggression. Our primary goal
is to determine whether policing and pacifying interventions have
different effects on aggression dynamics and hence different
mechanistic benefits. A second, more ambitious goal is to ask why,
as with cellular immunity, we observe in social systems triadic as
well as dyadic strategies for managing conflict. We use the
macaque genus, a model system for social evolution [21,22], to
develop the theory, working with a data set describing conflict
dynamics collected from a large pigtailed macaque (Macaca
nemestrina) society housed at the Yerkes National Primate
Research Center (Methods 1).
A multi-scale immuno-dynamics approach
In the case of policing in animal societies, the aggressive dyad or
fight-complex, is targeted, eliminated, and resolved into peaceful
or ‘‘passive’’ individuals. As illustrated in Fig. 1., the triadic
character of policing interventions (P) is roughly comparable to the
action of T cells that identify infected cells (a complex of pathogen
and host cell) and eliminate them from a population. During a
pacifying intervention an aggressive or agitated individual is
targeted and resolved into a peaceful state: Pacifiers (S) identify
aggressive individuals on route to fight, or while the fight
momentarily abates, and through direct interaction, induce them
to transform to a passive state (Fig. 1 IV upper schematic).
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Pacifying interventions are comparable to the behavior of
antibodies engaging pairwise with pathogens to prevent infection
of susceptible cells.
Without an immune response infection threatens to exponen-
tially encompass a population of susceptible cells (Fig. 1 I). The T
cell response requires activation of naive T cells by antigen
presenting cells. The T cells are then able to recognize ‘‘foreign’’
antigens on the infected cell surface and remove these cells
clearing the infection (Fig. 1 II upper schematic). Homeostatic
regulation of the cell population restores depleted cells. B cells bind
antigen directly, and through interaction with helper T cells,
generate antibody to antigen, leading to antigen clearance prior to
cellular infection (Fig. 1 II lower schematic). Similarly in the
absence of social immunity aggression in an animal society
threatens to exponentially encompass a group through behavioral
redirection of aggression (Fig. 1 III) [23,24].
Unlike cellular immunity, however, neither policing nor
pacifying interventions kills the target. Instead these strategies
terminate deleterious behavioral patterns, transforming the target
and keeping the population size constant. Neither behavioral
strategy requires ‘‘fourth’’ party activation of the conflict manage-
ment mechanism –hence there is no apparent social immune analog
to cellular immune priming. In contrast to cellular immunity, the
effectiveness of policing and pacifying interventions is not assured,
as effectiveness depends in part on characteristics of the individual
performing the intervention, on the character of the conflict itself,
and on properties of the conflict time-series [6,24].
Adaptive immune systems possess the property of antigen
mediated clonal selection and expansion. In animal societies, in
contrast, passive individuals can spontaneously adopt a policing
strategy and remain in that state until the number of aggressive
individuals decreases to some threshold value. Another important
difference is that within the biological immune system, pathogens
form a population independent from immune cells, whereas
behavioral conflict management strategies are implemented by
individuals belonging to the same group as the conflict parti-
cipants. Hence functional constraints on conflict management due
to partially aligned interests among group members are likely more
significant in social systems than in the case of pathogen control.
However, in mechanical terms the fundamental pathogenic
property is the ability to transform the state of a cell, increase
cellular rates of mortality and proliferate through a population.
These are also properties of aggression that can be thought of as a
transmissible state of behavior. Proliferation of aggression leads to
larger fights and an increased probability of individual mortality
[23,24]. The contagion property of both pathogens and aggres-
sion, coupled to similar management mechanics instantiated in
dyadic and triadic interactions, suggests that comparison are
warranted despite critical differences in implementation.
In the empirical section of the Results, we further describe the
mechanics of policing and pacifying interventions in our pigtailed
macaque study system. In the theory section of the Results we
develop empirically-grounded immuno-dynamics models to ex-
plore the implications of these alternative strategies for containing
aggression.
Results
Empirical description of pacifying and policing in
pigtailed macaques
In previous work [6], it was shown empirically that pigtailed
macaques use both policing and pacifying interventions. It was
also shown that the frequency distribution of policing interventions
is heavy-tailed. The frequency distribution of pacifying interven-
tions on the other hand is normal. This difference suggests that
there might be a proto-division of labor for policing interventions
but not for pacifying interventions. Here we determine whether
this is the case.
We define a proto-division of labor as specialization on a group
beneficial task by a subset of components in the absence of
complementary specialization by a second subset. A full division of
labor minimally involves two subsets, each specializing on
complementary tasks [25]. Role specialization, defined here as
either individual, age-sex class, or other subgroup specific strategy
sets, is a foundational assumption of game dynamics yet is rarely
empirically evaluated outside the study of cellular immunity or
social insect societies. Role specialization on strategy sets can be
operationalized statistically.
An individual is said to specialize on conflict management generally if
its policing (POL) frequency is wmPOLzsPOL AND pacifying
Figure 1. Comparison of the structure of cellular and social
immunity. The top two panels illustrate cellular infection and
immunity. The bottom two panels illustrate social infectivity and social
immunity. (I) Pathogens infect cells and thereby proliferate. (II) Naive T
cells are presented with antigen epitopes by antigen presenting cells
(APC), inducing them to target infected cells and eliminate them. B cells
sequester antigen and are induced to generate antibodies to these by T
helper cells. (III) Individuals become aggressive and by direct contact
with others redirect aggression infectiously. (IV) Pacifiers (S) engage
with aggressive individuals, calming them down thereby preventing
redirection. Police (P) intervene directly into conflicts, resolving disputes
and returning combatants to the passive state. In animal conflict it is a
state of behavior that is transmitted that arises spontaneously from
within the population.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022709.g001
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(PAC) frequency is wmPACzsPAC , where m is the sample mean
and s denotes one standard deviation about the mean. Policing
specialization is POL wmPOLzsPOL and PAC vmPAC{sPAC .
Pacifying specialization is POL vmPOL{sPOL and PAC wmPACz
sPAC (unless otherwise noted, all empirical analyses in this paper
use corrected frequency data, in which an individual’s frequency is
equal to a measured deviation from an expected score, see
Methods 1). Note that whereas the distribution of pacifying
interventions is normal, the distribution of policing interventions is
roughly heavy-tailed. Given that we are interested in evidence for
concerted deviations from the average behavior of all individuals
in the group, including those in the tail, we operationalize
specialization with respect to the standard deviation of the policing
and pacifying distributions regardless of the form of those
distributions (e.g. normal, heavy tailed, etc).
Considering the 48 socially mature animals in the group, we
find no evidence for general conflict management specialization
and no evidence for pacifying specialization. Only three adult
males, EO, QS, FO, exhibit policing specialization Fig. 2. These
three individuals account for 39% of the 477 policing interventions
but only 10% of the 304 pacifying interventions. The remaining 45
socially-mature group members show no preference for either
policing or pacifying, performing as many policing as pacifying
interventions (deviation from expected frequencies (DEF), policing
data are non-normal, n=45, Wilcoxon signed rank test, V =460,
p= .52). Elsewhere we have shown that the distribution of social
power (degree of consensus among group members that an
individual can use force successfully during fights), by modulating
the cost of social interaction, influences individual strategy choice
[6,26,27]. In our study group the power distribution is not
significantly different than lognormal (log-transformed (ln(xz1))
data, Lilliefors KS test, n=48, D=0.123, p= .08). The three
individuals specializing on policing (henceforth, ‘‘the policers’’)
occupy the tail of this power distribution and respectively have
24.29, 8.85 and 7.82 times more power than the average
individual among the remaining 45.
Approaching conflicts, required for both pacifying and policing
interventions, is costly because conflict participants frequently
redirect aggression to interveners [6,28]. The cost of pacifying and
policing interventions can be measured as aggression or threat
received in response to intervention (Methods 1). We find that cost
decreases with increasing power for policing but not pacifying
interventions (data include policers and the 42 of 45 non-policers
who perform both pacifying and policing interventions, DEF
POL: data nonnormal, n=45, Kendall’s Rank Correlation:
Tau=20.26, p=0.01, DEF PAC: data nonnormal, n=45,
Tau=20.08, p= .48).
We find no significant difference between cost of pacifying and
cost of policing for the 42 non-policers (deviation from expected cost
(DEC), data are non-normal, n=42, Wilcoxon signed rank test,
Figure 2. Specialization on policing produces a proto-division of labor in a macaque society. Only three individuals, EO, QS, and FO,
enclosed by the dashed purple ellipse, perform policing at a minimum of one standard deviation greater than the mean deviation from expected
frequencies for the population (DEF; see text for definition) and pacifying at one standard deviation less than the mean DEF. EO’s policing frequency
is six standard deviations greater than the mean DEF. The dashed green line indicates the mean deviation from expected pacifying frequency (n= 48).
The dashed fuscia line indicates the mean deviation from expected policing frequency (n= 48). The dashed yellow line indicates the mean frequency
of intervention performed by the 48 socially-mature individuals. The bar color is graded from red to black to make individual differences easier to see.
The patchy distribution of the state space supports the interpretation of behavior in terms of statistically-defined strategy classes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022709.g002
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V =375, p=0.35). The cost paid by policers for policing is two
orders of magnitude less than the average deviation from expected
cost paid by the other 42 animals (DEC: n=45, m=21.36,
sd =5.11, EO=230.30, QS=26.59, FO=26.691, remaining 42
individuals: m=20.32, sd =2.25). EO was not observed to receive
aggression in response to any of his 104 policing interventions.
The policers pay a slightly higher cost than expected for
pacifying (DEC: n=45, m=0.097, sd =1.63, EO=21.34, QS=
0.04, FO=2.32, remaining 42 individuals, m=0.06, sd =1.66),
but this cost is still negligible as they receive threats in response to
fewer than 5% of their pacifying interventions and never receive
contact aggression.
We find that the effectiveness –the ability to terminate a fight or
reduce the severity of aggression (Methods 1) – of policing, but not
pacifying, increases with increasing power (data include the three
policers and the 42 nonpolicers who perform both intervention
types, DEF POL: data nonnormal, n=45, Kendall’s Rank
Correlation: Tau=0.34, p=0.001, DEF PAC: data nonnormal,
n=45, Tau=0.19, p= .07). The policers are more than four
orders of magnitude more effective at policing than the remaining
42 individuals (DEF: all 45 individuals, m=1.9, sd =9.61,
EO=61.64, QS= 15.07, FO=8.90, remaining 42 individuals,
m= .0005, sd =1.67).
The policers are 11 times more effective than expected at
breaking up or reducing the intensity of fights using policing
interventions than they are when using pacifying interventions
(DEF POL: EO=61.64, QS= 15.07, FO=8.90, DEF PAC:
EO=4.30, QS= 1.50, FO=2.15). The remaining 42 socially-
mature group members perform as many effective policing as
effective pacifying interventions (DEF, data are non-normal,
n=42, Wilcoxon signed rank test, D=474, p= .78).
To summarize, the data indicate that a small subset of the group
performs policing, everyone engages in pacifying, and policing is
better than pacifying at controlling the escalation of aggression
when the policers are powerful. The effectiveness and cost of
policing appear to depend on relative power in a heavy-tailed
power distribution. Hence a power-based state dependence supports
specialization on policing but does not influence pacifying. We find
no evidence suggesting that pacifying is state dependent.
Social immuno-dynamics modeling results
We have explored elsewhere why a high variance distribution of
power is required to support policing [6,26]. We and others have
also considered how conflict management mechanisms such as
policing evolve [3,5,15,26]. We seek an ontogenetic explanation
for how policing, when performed by few individuals, can
effectively control conflict or reduce its frequency in social groups.
And, why pacifying strategies, performed by many individuals, are
less effective. If we are able to reproduce these conflict manage-
ment patterns, we shall have succeeded in accounting for the
division of labor in policing, and the widespread, undifferentiated,
adoption of pacifying. This will provide the beginnings of an
account for diverse forms of conflict management at the social
level, and the grounds for a more informed comparison with the
control of contagion among populations of cells.
We develop two classes of models –one for pacifying and one for
policing. We explore how the degree of specialization on a
management strategy influences conflict dynamics (for a review of
this approach [19,20]). Degree of specialization in these models is
operationalized as the proportion of individuals in the group
performing conflict management.
In the pacification model, we assume a population of passive
individuals x that spontaneously become aggressive y at a rate f1x
(Methods 2). Once in an aggressive state, these are capable of
‘‘infecting’’ further individuals through social contagion inducing
them to become aggressive. From the resulting aggressive dyad or
complex D, emerge two aggressive individuals. Monitoring is
performed by a population of individuals – conflict managers z –
who identify aggressive states prior to the formation of the
complex and form an intervention dyad Dz. This resolves into a
single manager and pacified individual. In this model, conflict
managers have no influence over conflicts that have already
begun. The initial conditions corresponding to the start of
observations of behavior are, x(0)~x0, y(0)~y0,z(0)~z0 and
D(0)~Dz~0.
In Figure 3B, we illustrate the steady state frequencies of the
each of the state variables as a function of the proportion of
individuals in the population assuming a pacifying, conflict
management role. We find that the total number of fights declines
monotonically with increased pacifying as do the number of
aggressive individuals. For a large decrease in aggression, there
needs to be a concomitant large increase in the proportion of
individuals in the population assuming the pacifier role.
Given that pacifiers exist in only two states, and their total
number is assumed to be conserved, we make the observation that,
dz
dt
z
d(Dz)
dt
~0[z(t)zDz(t)~z0 ð1Þ
This allows us to express the state variable Dz in terms of z and the
initial number of pacifiers at the start of observations, z0.
Furthermore, we assume that the total population size remains
constant,
x(t)zy(t)zz(t)z2D(t)z2Dz~K : ð2Þ
This allows us to express the fight complex D in terms of x, y and z
and two constants:
D(t)~
1
2
(K{2z0{x(t){y(t)zz(t)) ð3Þ
We minimize the number of parameters by assuming that there
are three time scales in the dynamics. A time scale at which fights
are initiated and monitored, a second time scale at which fights are
resolved, and a very slow time scale at which aggression emerges.
Thus f1~c f3~f5~f and f2~f4~s. These assumptions allow us
to write down a 3-dimensional dynamical system (rather than 5-
dimensional), that describes the conflict management dynamics.
_x~{cx{sxyzf (z0{z) ð4Þ
_y~cx{sy(xz2yzz)zf (K{2z0{x{yzz) ð5Þ
_z~{szyzf (z0{z) ð6Þ
As per our assumptions: cvvs,f , and furthermore, that the
population size is significantly greater than the number of police,
Kw2z0. We find that there are two steady states. The first steady
state is at z&z0, y&0, x&K{z0, Dz&0&D. This state is always
unstable. The other steady state is at yz2D&K{2z0, Dz~z0{z
and x&z&
fz0
fzsy
, where y is approximately the unique positive
solution to 2s2y3z3fsy2zf (fz4sz0{sK)y{f
2(K{2z0)~0.
Social Immune Systems
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Thus if there are few police, z0vvK , the population is made up
largely of aggressors (y) and ‘‘fighters’’ (2D). For fixed values of the
remaining parameters, the steady state values of y and D are
monotonically decreasing in z0.
In the policing model, the conflict managers, called policers z,
do not target aggressives y before they engage in conflict as in the
antibody model, but resolve disputes directly, by intervening and
eliminating fights between pairs forming in this case a triadic
variable Dz composed of both the complex D and the policer z. As
before, the conflict managers exist in two states, and their total
number is conserved:
dz
dt
z
d(Dz)
dt
~0[z(t)zDz(t)~z0 ð7Þ
The total population size is constant,
x(t)zy(t)zz(t)z2D(t)z3Dz(t)~K : ð8Þ
Thus
D~
1
2
(K{3z0{x{yz2z): ð9Þ
We assume three timescales, with cvvs,f and Kw2z0. In
addition, we assume cKvvf 2=s.
_x~{cx{sxyz2f (z0{z) ð10Þ
_y~cx{sy(xz2y)zf (K{3z0{x{yz2z) ð11Þ
_z~{sz
1
2
(K{3z0{x{yz2z)zf (z0{z) ð12Þ
This dynamic has a steady state with y&0. In this case,
however, for critical values of the parameter set, this state is stable.
In particular the state has z&z0, x&K{z0 and y&0&D&Dz
and is stable iff z0 is greater than approximately f =s. Thus we have
a state in which there are almost no aggressors or fights being
stable provided there are initially more than a threshold number of
policers. This threshold declines as the duration of fights increases
and as the interaction rate (which is both the rate at which fights
are initiated and the rate at which police intervene in fights)
increases. When these values are high there are few free
aggressors. Interestingly the policing threshold appears to be
independent of the population size K , provided that this size is not
too large (Kvvf 2=(sc)). Thus unlike in the B cell model, the T
cell model is capable of leading to stable societies in which there is
no unrest with only small rates of conflict management. This
modeling finding is consistent with the data from our study group
in which 17% of the &1100 conflicts observed received effective
policing interventions. This level of policing has been shown
empirically in a behavioral knockout experiment to be sufficient to
reduce general levels of aggression [23].
We consider a larger family of models expanding on our basic
policing and pacifying structures to cover and analyze a richer
space of strategic permutations. These are illustrated using conflict
reaction graphs in Figure 4 (full mathematical description in
Methods). These include cases in which passives can transform
into police (spontaneous policing); aggressives can transform into
the passive state spontaneously (temporary aggression), and where
the policers switch to non-policing when policing is common
(conditional policing – negative frequency dependence). The
results of all of these models are summarized in Table 1. Each
model possesses multiple stationary states (a maximum of three)
and we indicate those that are stable. Of greatest social interest are
those strategies where multiple equilibria exist. These are models
that allow transitions between strategy classes, such as switching
from a policer to a pacifier. In the case where pacifiers become
police spontaneously at a low rate, and where policing interven-
tions can fail inducing the police to become aggressive, this results
Figure 3. Steady state frequencies of aggressive individuals y, passive individuals x, fighting pairs, D, and police z as a function of
the proportion of policing individuals z(0)=K . Assuming policing interventions (A) we observe a threshold value of police above which conflict
is effectively eradicated. Under pacifying interventions (B), conflict declines monotonically in the proportion of pacifiers. For these figures we have
used parameter values: f~0:5; s~0:01; k~110. The parametric sensitivity of these results are indicated analytically in the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022709.g003
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in a solution with multiple equilibria. These include a population
that engages in chronic violence (only aggressive individuals
and aggressive dyads exist), a ‘civil-solution’ in which policing
effectively controls aggression and passive individuals dominate,
and a ‘police-state’ in which the entire population is driven to
become police. The most harmonious case arises when we assume
that aggressive individuals can transform spontaneously to passive
individuals. In this case, the combination of policing and a
tendency towards peace, generates a population with minimal
aggression, dominated by a few police and many passives.
We also consider models that allow for a form of proto-clonal
expansion through negative frequency dependence. In the class of
strategies that we refer to as conditional, police transform into a
passive state when the frequency of police in the population is
high. Hence when two police meet, one will transform into a
passive. This generates two stable equilibria. One, the ‘Utopian
Figure 4. Conflict networks illustrated as reaction graphs. Open nodes are single individuals. Closed nodes are groups of 2 or more
individuals. Directed edges represent transformations but not stoichiometry. Merging input edges into a single closed node corresponds to the
formation of a complex (dyad or triad). Cycles represent transformations that yield one starting state and one alternative. The six conflict networks
are: (A) B-cell inspired pacification. (B) T-cell inspired policing. (C) Spontaneous policing. (D) Temporary aggression. (E) Conditional Policing. (F)
Conditional, Temporary Policing. Hence in (A) x becomes aggressive and transforms to y. The aggressive individual y interacts with x to form a fight
D which then resolves into aggressive individuals y. The strategy z interacts with y to form the pacifying dyad Dz which then resolves into z and x. In
the most complicated example (F), x becomes aggressive and transforms to y, and y can revert to x. The aggressive individual y interacts with x to
form a fightD which then resolves into aggressive individuals y. The strategy x can spontaneously transform into z. The strategy z can interact with D
to form the triadic complex Dz , which resolves into x and z. he strategy z can spontaneously transform into x.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022709.g004
Social Immune Systems
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 August 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 8 | e22709
equilibrium’, in which the entire population becomes passive. And
another ‘‘Dystopian equilibrium’’ in which the population
descends into violence.
These more complex models of conflict management illustrate
the double-edged sword of policing. If conditions are favorable,
then policing can be very effective at reducing or eliminating
conflict, with a small population of police. But if policing can fail
or policing ceases in response to the presence of others (a form of
free-loading), policing can lead to deleterious outcomes in which
populations become police states -everyone polices - or violence
becomes chronic and ubiquitous.
Discussion
We have investigated mechanisms that minimize the contagion
of deleterious conflict in a social system. We described the
mechanics of two fundamental classes of conflict management
mechanism empirically, using data collected from a primate
society model system, and mathematically, using dynamical
models inspired by the structure of immune systems. We observe
a dyadic (two-way) class in which individuals preempt aggression
thereby preventing the contagion of aggression (pacifying), and a
triadic class (three way) in which individuals directly manage
ongoing conflicts (policing), minimizing the redirection and
propogation of aggression.
We observe empirically that there is no individual specialization
for pacification behavior. Pacification is performed by many
individuals. In our model simulations and analysis aggression
declines monotonically with an increasing frequency of pacifica-
tion. We observe empirically that there is however specialization
by a few individuals for policing interventions. In our simulation
and analytical results policing but not pacifying is capable of
almost completely eliminating conflict, and does so above a
critical-threshold proportion of police. These results are consistent
with a previous experimental study in which it was found that
pacifying interventions alone were not sufficient to maintain low
levels of aggression [23].
When policing interactions can fail – aggravating aggres-
sion and inducing non-policers to switch to policing in compen-
sation – multiple stable equilibria are observed (Model 3 Table 1).
The population can either occupy a highly aggressive state, the
population of policers can grow to take over the population in
order to control aggression, or policing and passive individuals can
coexist at comparable numbers. The solutions are determined by
the balance between spontaneous policing and the corruption of
police following failed interventions. Our empirical data suggest
that policing is a relative state dependent strategy, in so far as it
appears to require a high variance in the distribution of power, or
some other analog measure of resource disparity, to arise. Hence
the second and third of the equilibrium states of this model are
unlikely to be realized as these states assume that many individuals
assume a policing role - albeit somewhat ineffectively. The first
equilibrium state –a transition to high aggression when policing
fails– is consistent with experimental findings showing that when
policing is disabled, aggression increases, and hence that effective
policing is critical to preventing social destabilization in systems in
which policing is the primary conflict management mechanism
[7,23].
Finally, we have shown analytically that policing (T cell strategy)
is the more efficient strategy, as conflict can be eliminated with only
a small proportion of policers. We find no such threshold for
pacifying interventions, nor is there any empirical support
suggesting such a threshold. The advantage of pacifying
interventions is that they are not dependent on power but can
be used by anyone, and thus might provide a first line of defense
against contagion of aggression in the absence of complex social
structure. More generally, our results here and in previous work
[6] suggest that social structure is a constraint on conflict
management, with different distributions of power, for example,
favoring different conflict management mechanisms.
Comparison to Cellular Immunity
The immuno-dynamics approach and its results reveal critical
similarities between social and cellular immunity. Both can be
thought of as evolved mechanisms for minimizing the costs of
contagion. Similarities include: (1) Dedicated agents adapted to
preventing propagation of deleterious or dangerous states. (2) An
ability to recognize, engage and clear deleterious factors. (3) A
pairwise mechanism and a triadic mechanism. (4) Role differen-
tiation for some aspects of conflict control. (5) Thresholds in the
response associated with clearance of danger.
Critical differences include: (1) Non-destructive interactions in
the social mechanisms and destructive mechanisms in the cellular
mechanisms. (2) Direct activation in the social case and fourth-
party mediated activation in the cellular case. (3) Selective
proliferation of distinct cell-types in the cellular case, and a steady
state response or generic proliferation in the social case. (4) An
ability to assume both pacifying and policing roles in the social
case, but with only a subpopulation effective in the policing role.
(5) Differentiation into management roles in primate social systems
acquired through a comparatively fast learning mechanism rather
than genetic mechanisms such as somatic hypermutation.
In much the same way that immuno-dynamics grew out of the
application of epidemic models to the cells of a single individual,
and prion dynamics grew from immuno-dynamics in the absence
pathogens assuming only protein mis-folding, here we have
considered the immuno-dynamics of a state of behavior without
an extrinsic pathogen-like entity. As with prions in which
misfolded proteins induce further misfolding, aggressive individ-
uals induce further aggression. The key analogy across all of these
systems is our ability to describe them using dynamical systems
that take account of contagion and evolved mechanisms of
mitigation.
Table 1. The composition of multiple, stable equilibria under
six models of third party intervention.
Model Equilibrium 1 Equilibrium 2 Equilibrium 3
1. Pacifying x,y,z,D,Dz – –
2. Policing x,y,z,D,Dz z,x –
3. Spontaneous policing y,D x,z z
4. Temporary aggression x Z –
5. Conditional police x y,D –
6. Conditional, temporary x,y – –
Models represent variation in pacifying and policing strategies. Models are
described in the text and full mathematical details are provided in Methods 2.
Those configurations for which there exist stable solutions are marked by the
variables present in their locally stable equilibria. Empty columns (marked by a
dash) are not stable or do not exist. Hence in the pacifying model (model 1) all
strategies are stable and present at equilibrium. In the model of spontaneous
policing (model 3) there are three stable equilibria, a violent equilibrium in
which there are only fights and aggressive individuals present, a civil
equilibrium in where there are passive individuals and police, and a police-state
equilibrium in which all individuals become police.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022709.t001
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Evolutionary-ecological Issues
In emphasizing mechanisms for the containment of aggression
within a single generation, the approach we have adopted is more
akin to ecological models of microbial infection and clearance than
to evolutionary models in social evolution of punishment (e.g. [15–
17]) and policing (e.g. [3,5,15]). The goals of models of punish-
ment and policing are to identify optimal or stable parameter
values that through fixed payoffs facilitate cooperative evolution.
Punishment is typically defined functionally, with the term
punishment applied when an individual, at a cost to itself, inflicts
a cost on another individual for failing to cooperate. Policing is
typically defined as the repression of competition, and sometimes
mechanistically as impartial or indiscriminate conflict intervention
that can lead to the repression of competition, as in this paper.
Much work on punishment assumes policing has the same basic
payoff structure to punishment and hence is a subclass of
punishment.
One advantage of studying ecological effects is that doing so can
reveal a complex strategy space lurking behind functional
assumptions. It is well known in the empirical community that
there are multiple behavioral strategies for managing conflict
[2,6,18,21]. Neither impartial intervention (policing) nor pacifying
– two of these strategies – falls easily under the supposed catch-all
cost-benefit definition of punishment. Policing and pacifying vary
in cost to performer and in cost to target. In both cases, the direct
cost (e.g. aggression received during the intervention) to target and
performer can be close to zero, and the average cost of policing
paid by powerful individuals is nearly zero [6], which violates
common assumptions in punishment models. Policing and
pacifying also vary on three rarely considered factors relating to
benefits. They vary in their effectiveness at controlling the
proliferation of aggression and reducing the frequency with which
conflicts are expressed as fights. They also vary in terms of the
demands made on social structure, with policing requiring rather
special resource distributions or power structures to be accessible,
regardless of whether individuals acquire them through learning or
genetic inheritance. They are also likely to vary in indirect effects
that operate over longer timescales, but little is known about this.
The theory literature on punishment makes a distinction
between peer punishment and pool punishment [29–31]. In peer
punishment individuals impose a fine on defectors at a cost to
themselves. In pool punishment individuals contribute, prior to the
joint effort, resources to a pool that funds defector control
mechanisms like punishment. A ‘‘police force’’ paid for by taxes is
an example. Hence pool punishment would appear to be
distinguished from peer punishment by two factors: the assignment
of conflict management roles to specific individuals or subgroups
and a tax on the population to support these roles.
Our data, however, suggest that a tax levied specifically to
support the role division is not necessary. To understand why this
is the case, first consider how the policing role is assigned in our
study system. The high variance power structure that supports
policing emerges from status signaling network in which
individuals give subordination signals to others they perceive to
be more capable of using force [26]. The decision to signal is the
outcome of an agonistic interaction history between the signal
receiver and sender in which the sender has learned it is likely
loose with that particular receiver. Conceding to the subordinate
role by signaling is costly, but it is less costly than not signaling at all
when an asymmetry in fighting ability is apparent [32]. It also has
benefits as pairs with subordination contracts show increased
socio-positive interactions over those without subordination
contracts [32,33]. Hence subordination signal exchange is in the
interest of sender as well as receiver. As such the signaling
dynamics are cost-free [34] as long as the subordination contract
can be reversed if the underlying asymmetry in fighting ability is
reversed, or terminated if the underlying asymmetry shrinks
[27,32].
Receivers by tracking the total number of signals they receive as
well as how much agreement there is the number of signals sent by
each sender can estimate how much power group members
perceive them to have [6], which in turn tells them about the cost
they will pay for intervening and engaging in social interactions
more generally [26]. In many respects the signaling dynamics
underlying the emergence of policing are like voting dynamics
[32], as group members are, by virtue of how they distribute their
signals, effectively determining whether there will be a ‘‘police
force’’ and who should be on it. The policing role is in essence
assigned to individuals through this voting scheme. This means
that a police force can arise naturally if there already are pre-
existing underlying heterogeneities in state (in our case, fighting
ability or resource holding potential) that support signaling
patterns leading to a heavy-tailed distribution of power [6]. No
additional taxation is required beyond that which weaker indi-
viduals pay to maintain subordination contracts.
Looking forward, evolutionary models focusing on the function
of policing will ideally derive optimum parameter values for inter-
vention and switching based on empirically observed strategies. In
this way frequency-dependent decisions involving policing will
build upon a demonstrated density dependent dynamics of
contagion.
Future Work
The creation of an immuno-dynamic theory of conflict raises
many issues for social systems. In much the way that there are
optimal schedules for delivering drugs [35] that minimize
opportunities for the evolution of resistance, are there schedules
of intervention behavior that reduce co-evolutionary-escalation?
Analyses quantifying strategic periodicities in conflict dynamics
show that in our study group policing occurs on the hour
timescale [24]. This suggests that the concept of intervention
schedules in social systems is not farfetched. Often disease is not
caused by infection but by an over-reactive immune system -
immuno-pathology [36,37]. This is reminiscent of the response of
states to terrorism in which the principal damage is achieved by a
response incommensurate with the magnitude of the attack.
When policing has a high failure rate, this is what our models
predict – anarchy or a police state. And there is in the intriguing
phenomenon of immune memory, whereby, chronic low level
infection might be required to ensure long term resistance to
infection [38]. Does society require an analogous chronic conflict
of low magnitude to maintain effective responses to rare, high-
magnitude assaults? Whereas the analogy to the cellular immune
system is only approximate, broad patterns of behavior associated
with mechanisms for containing infection are expected to be
rather general. By incorporating observations relating to
individual variation, and individually-targeted responses, we
foresee further parallels with the theory of clonal selection and
expansion.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All data were collected in compliance with the ethical standards
set by the Emory University animal care and welfare committee
and IACUC approval (proposal 216-97). was obtained to conduct
the study. As this was an observational study, the only change to
the daily routine of the animals that was required to collect the
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data was that the animals had to be confined to their outdoor
housing during each observation period. Water, monkey chow
(remaining from morning feeding), enrichment (e.g. toys, climbing
structures, etc.) and substantial space were available continuously
throughout all observation periods. On very hot or rainy days,
observations were terminated and the monkeys were given access
to their indoor housing. As part of standard Yerkes management
protocol, the animals were routinely subject to medical examina-
tion and care.
Model System
Macaque societies are characterized by social learning at the
individual level, social structures that arise from nonlinear
processes and feedback to influence individual behavior, frequent
non-kin interactions and multiplayer conflicts, the cost and
benefits of which can be quantified at the individual and social
network levels [7,21–23,39]. These properties coupled to highly
resolved data make this system an excellent one for drawing
inferences about critical processes in social evolution as well as for
developing new modeling approaches that are intended to apply
more broadly.
In this study we focus on one species in the genus, the pigtailed
macaque (Macaca nemestrina). The data set, collected by J.C.
Flack, is from a large, captive, breeding group of pigtailed macaques
that was housed at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center in
Lawrenceville, Georgia. Pigtailed macaques have frequent conflict
and employ targeted intervention and repair strategies for managing
conflict [23]. The study group had a demographic structure
approximating wild populations. Subadult males were regularly
removed to mimic emigration occurring in wild populations. The
group contained 84 individuals, including 4 adult males, 25 adult
females, and 19 subadults (totaling 48 socially-mature individuals
used in the analyses). All individuals, except 8 (4 males, 4 females),
were either natal to the group or had been in the group since
formation. The group was housed in an indoor-outdoor facility, the
outdoor compound of which was 125665 ft.
Pigtailed macaques are indigenous to south East Asia and live in
multimale, multifemale societies characterized by female matri-
lines and male group transfer upon onset of puberty [40]. Pigtailed
macaques breed all year. Females develop swellings when in
Œstrus.
Data Collection Protocol
During observations all individuals were confined to the
outdoor portion of the compound and were visible to the observer.
The 156 hours of observations occurred for up to eight hours daily
between 1,100 and 2,000 hours over a twenty-week period from
June until October 1998 and were evenly distributed over the day.
Provisioning occurred before observations, and once during
observations. The data were collected over a four-month period
during which the group was stable (defined as no reversals in status
signaling interactions resulting in a change to an individual’s
power score [26]).
Conflict and power (subordination signal) data were collected
using an all-occurrence sampling procedure [41] in which the
compound was repeatedly scanned from left to right for onset of
conflict or the occurrence of silent-bared teeth displays. The
entire conflict event was then followed and data collected
included start time, end time, the identity of individuals involved
as aggressors, recipients, or interveners and their behavior.
Operational Definitions
Conflict: any interaction in which one individual threatens or
aggresses a second individual. A conflict was considered
terminated if no aggression or withdrawal responses (fleeing,
crouching, screaming, running away, submission signals) occurred
for two minutes from the last such event. A conflict can involve
multiple pairs if pair-wise conflicts result in aggressive interven-
tions by third parties or redirections by at least one conflict
participant.
Intervention: Third-party to conflict approaches with 3 m and
directs aggressive behavior, affiliative behavior, submissive behav-
ior, interposes itself between/equidistant to conflict participants, or
approaches in a directed manner, looking at the conflict, but
showing no other behavior.
Pacifying Intervention: Third-party to conflict approaches
within 3 m and directs non-aggressive behavior at one conflict
participant within 5 s of conflict. Nonaggressive behavior can
include grooming, lip-smacking, puckering, presenting (directing
hindquarters at another individual), or emitting a silent bared-teeth
display.
Policing Intervention: Third-party to conflict approaches within
3 m and impartially threatens all conflict participants or interposes
itself approximately equidistant to conflict participants within 5 s
of conflict.
Cost: highest level of aggression received by an individual from
any conflict participants in response to its intervention regardless
of whether the conflict participant was the target of the
intervention. Aggression varies from facial threat to severe bites
(threat = 1 point, lunge or brief chase = 2 points, long chase or
slap = 3 points, grapple or wrestle = 4 points, bite less than
5 seconds = 5 points, and bite greater than 5 s = 6 points).
Effectiveness: Interventions were considered effective if within
5 seconds of the intervention the entire fight was terminated,
meaning that all conflict participants dispersed, or the intensity of
aggression used by any of the participants was reduced (and
remained reduced for the duration of the fight) without a
concomitant increase in aggression or agitation (screaming) by
any other participants.
Power: Degree of consensus among group members than an
individual can use force successfully. Power scores for each
individual were calculated using a procedure described in [26]. In
brief, the total frequency of peacefully-emitted subordination
signals (which reflect perception by the sender that the receiver
can successfully use force [32]) received by an individual over a
given duration (in this case, the study duration, which was
approximately four months) is corrected for the uniformity
(measured using Shannon entropy) of its distribution of signals
received from its population of potential senders (all socially-
mature individuals).
Calculation of Corrected Frequencies
Raw data for all dependent variables (policing and paci-
fying frequency, cost, and effectiveness) were processed into
deviation from expected frequencies (called observed minus
expected scores previously, for full exposition see: [6]. This
approach controls for underlying variation in the tendency to
intervene.
Model Details
In the following 6 models we introduce the stoichiometry and
dynamical systems describing conflict management introduced in
the paper. For the basic antibody model, and T cell model, we
only present the stoichiometry since the analysis appears in the
paper. For the remaining models, we provide details of
stoichiometry, dynamics and dynamical stability. Throughout,
parameters are as described in the paper.
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Antibody Model
x?
f1
y ð13Þ
xzy?
f2
D ð14Þ
yzy?
f2
D ð15Þ
D?
f3
2y ð16Þ
zzy?
f4
Dz ð17Þ
Dz?
f5
zzx ð18Þ
The initial conditions corresponding to the start of observa-
tions of behavior are, x(0)~x0, y(0)~y0, z(0)~z0 and D(0)~
Dz~0.
T cell Model
In the T cell model the conflict managers, called policers, do not
target aggressives y before they engage in conflict as in the
antibody model, but resolve disputes directly, by intervening and
eliminating fights between pairs forming in this case a triadic
variable Dz. The kinetics of T cell conflict management are
described by the following scheme:
x?
f1
y ð19Þ
xzy?
f2
D ð20Þ
yzy?
f2
D ð21Þ
D?
f3
2y ð22Þ
zzD?
f4
Dz ð23Þ
Dz?
f5
zz2x ð24Þ
Spontaneous Policing
Now instead of assuming a constant population of policers, we
assume that passives can become police at some small rate. In
addition, there is a small probability that policing fails to resolve
fights in a satisfactory manner. In that case, instead of two passives
and a police emerging from the interaction, all participants
become aggressive. Thus the number of police is determined by
the balance between the spontaneous new policing activity and the
corruption of police in failed interventions. The system can be
represented by the following ‘‘chemical’’ scheme and differential
equations:
x?
f6
z ð25Þ
x?
f1
y ð26Þ
xzy?
f2
D ð27Þ
yzy?
f2
D ð28Þ
D?
f3
2y ð29Þ
zzD?
f4
Dz ð30Þ
Dz?
f5
zz2x ð31Þ
Dz?
f7
3y ð32Þ
Assume, f1~c, f6~c’, f2~s, f4~s~O, f5~f (1{q), f7~fq and
pzq~1. Here p is the probability that a policing is successful.
_x~{(czc’)x{sxyz2fpDz ð33Þ
_y~cx{sy(xz2y)z2fDz3fqDz ð34Þ
_z~c’x{s’zDzfpDz ð35Þ
_D~sxyzsy2{s’zD{fD ð36Þ
_Dz~s’zD{fDz: ð37Þ
At steady state, we have Dz~c’x=(fq), zD~c’x=(s’q),
fD~sxyzsy2{c’x=q. Substituting into the equation for x, we
get y~1=s(2pc’=q{c{c’). This is true if pwq(czc’)=2c’,
otherwise x?0 and hence Dz?0 and z?0 and the population
consists entrirely of ys and Ds.
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We then obtain z~f =½s’(1{3q{cq=c’), for which we require
1w3qzqc=c’. If this is the case then, since c,c’vvs, yvv1 and
D,Dzvvx and hence x&K{z. Otherwise, we get z&K .
Thus there are three regimes: 1) If qw2c’=(3c’zc), then the
steady state population consists almost entirely of ys and Ds. 2) If
qvc’=(3c’zc), then the steady state population consists of xs and
zs with z~f =½s’(1{3q{cq=c’). 3) If c’=(3c’zc)vqv2c’=
(3c’zc) then the steady state populations consists almost entirely
of zs.
Since we assume that c’vvc, the value of q must be small in
order to avoid conflict.
Temporary Aggression
We now study a variant of the previous model in which
aggressives become passive at some slow rate. The model can be
represented:
x?
f6
z ð38Þ
x?
f1
y ð39Þ
y?
f8
x ð40Þ
xzy?
f2
D ð41Þ
yzy?
f2
D ð42Þ
D?
f3
2y ð43Þ
zzD?
f4
Dz ð44Þ
Dz?
f5
zz2x ð45Þ
Dz?
f7
3y ð46Þ
Assume, f1~c, f6~c’, f2~s, f4~s~O, f5~f (1{q), f7~fq,
f8~c’’ and pzq~1.
_x~{(czc’)x{sxyz2fpDzzc’’y ð47Þ
_y~cx{sy(xz2y)z2fDz3fqDz{c’’y ð48Þ
_z~c’x{s’zDzfpDz ð49Þ
_D~sxyzsy2{s’zD{fD ð50Þ
_Dz~s’zD{fDz: ð51Þ
This system has two steady states, namely when the whole
population consists of passives and when it consists of police. The
all x state is unstable and the all z state is stable. Thus in this
version of the model for which aggressives spontaneously become
passive at some slow rate, and passives spontaneously become
police at some slow rate, the population evolves to a state in which
almost the whole population consists of police.
Conditional Policing
We now remove the assumption that the aggressive population
spontaneously become passive and add the assumption that if
police encounter other police, one of them stops policing and
becomes passive. The rationale is that police only want to incur
the cost of policing if they don’t believe that another individual will
police. This is a form of negative frequency-dependence.
The system can be represented:
x?
f6
z ð52Þ
x?
f1
y ð53Þ
xzy?
f2
D ð54Þ
yzy?
f2
D ð55Þ
D?
f3
2y ð56Þ
zzD?
f4
Dz ð57Þ
Dz?
f5
zz2x ð58Þ
Dz?
f7
3y ð59Þ
zzz?
f9
zzx ð60Þ
Assume, f1~c, f6~c’, f2~s, f4~s~O, f5~f (1{q), f7~fq,
f9~f ’ and pzq~1.
_x~{(czc’)x{sxyz2fpDzzf ’z2 ð61Þ
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_y~cx{sy(xz2y)z2fDz3fqDz ð62Þ
_z~c’x{s’zDzfpDz{f ’z2 ð63Þ
_D~sxyzsy2{s’zD{fD ð64Þ
_Dz~s’zD{fDz: ð65Þ
This has two steady states, namely all x and all y and D. This is
true unless qvvc’, in which case the all x state is replaced by a
state in which x,y and D are all present. The all x state is unstable
while the all y and D state is stable.
Conditional, Temporary Policing
In this case aggressive individuals can spontaneously become
passive and two police interact to give one police and one passive.
The system is represented:
x?
f6
z ð66Þ
x?
f1
y ð67Þ
y?
f8
x ð68Þ
xzy?
f2
D ð69Þ
yzy?
f2
D ð70Þ
D?
f3
2y ð71Þ
zzD?
f4
Dz ð72Þ
Dz?
f5
zz2x ð73Þ
Dz?
f7
3y ð74Þ
zzz?
f9
zzx ð75Þ
Assume, f1~c, f6~c’, f2~s, f4~s~O, f5~f (1{q), f7~fq,
f8~c’’, f9~f ’ and pzq~1.
_x~{(czc’)x{sxyz2fpDzzf ’z2zc’’y ð76Þ
_y~cx{sy(xz2y)z2fDz3fqDz{c’’y ð77Þ
_z~c’x{s’zDzfpDz{f ’z2 ð78Þ
_D~sxyzsy2{s’zD{fD ð79Þ
_Dz~s’zD{fDz: ð80Þ
This has a single steady state with
x&
qfK
qfz2pc’
{
2pc’f (qz2pc’)
qs(fqz2pc’)
ð81Þ
y&
2pc’
qs
ð82Þ
and the rest adopt strategy D.
This assumes that c,c’,c’’vvf ,f ’s but that c’=q may be
reasonably large.
Thus in a society in which the police remain vigilant in the face
of policing, the aggressive state is of finite duration, and the steady
state consists of a mixture of passive, aggressive, and fighting
populations with very few police.
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